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I.INTRODUCTION
Misdemeanor child molestation, rape, promotion of prostitution, and
forcible sodomy: fourteen and sixteen.1 Eight rapes, effectuated through
death threats and excessive force: twelve and thirteen.2 First degree
sexual abuse and sexual misconduct: five and four. 3 These are some of
the offenses for which three of Missouri's sexually violent predators
("SVP") 4 have been convicted and a sampling of their victims' ages.
Enacted in 1998 to become effective in 1999, 5 the Sexually Violent
Predator Act is a mechanism whereby Missouri may civilly commit
those found to be sexually violent predators 6-defined as one "who
suffers from a mental abnormality which makes [him] more likely than
not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined" and
who has previously pled guilty to or been convicted of a sexually violent
offense.7
Missouri's SVP Act was amended in 2006 to lower the standard of
proof required for an SVP finding and to establish a conditional release
program for those committed. 8 Now, the court or the jury must find
one to be an SVP by clear and convincing evidence, whereas prior to the
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1. Dunivan v. State, 247 S.W.3d 77, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
2. Elliott v. State, 215 S.W.3d 88, 90 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
3. In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
4. The term "sexually violent predator" and the acronym "SVP" are used interchangeably throughout
this article.
5. H.B. 1405, Mo. Gen. Assembly (1998) (enacted).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480-.513 (2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
7. Id. § 632.480(5).
8. H.B. 1698, Mo. Gen. Assembly (2006), §§ 632.495, 632.505 (enacted).
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2006 amendments, the standard of proof was beyond a reasonable
doubt. 9 Further, Missouri's revised SVP Act seems to provide only for a
conditional release, instead of a complete discharge, for those
committed."
No one will argue with the fact that these crimes are heinous and that
these perpetrators need treatment. When one is adjudged to be a
sexually violent predator, however, the commitment is involuntary, and
the confinement term is indefinite." Given the public's fear and
anxiety regarding sex offenders, especially those who target children,
society is predisposed to lock them up and throw away the key.1 2  To
avoid reproach, however, our society must trust in our judicial processes
and involuntarily commit only those who are found to be sexually
violent predators beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the judicial
system must unconditionally release sexually violent predators when
they are deemed to no longer pose a danger to themselves or to others.
The methods by which our society commits and holds such individuals
implicate not only their behavior but also our own, for "[t]he degree of
civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons. ' 13
Part II of this article discusses the facts and holding of In re Van
Orden, the case at bar. The legal background, Part III, addresses relevant
case law from the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the
reasons courts have always deemed SVP laws civil statutes rather than
criminal. Part III proceeds to discuss Missouri's SVP Act and the
pertinent 2006 amendments. After addressing Addington v. Texas, the
seminal Supreme Court case on which Van Orden based its holding, Part
IV analyzes the Van Orden decision itself. Finally, in Part V, this article
concludes that In re Van Orden constituted a blemish on the Missouri
legislature and judiciary alike. Missouri, along with other states, must
recognize that SVP proceedings are akin to criminal trials and that their
result-indefinite and involuntary confinement-resembles criminal
9. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (2006) (requiring an SVP finding beyond a reasonable doubt),
with Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.495.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009) (requiring an SVP finding by clear and
convincing evidence).
10. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.498 (2006) (discussing the possibility of a discharge upon a
finding that the person "no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes the person likely to
engage in acts of sexual violence"), with Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 632.498, 632.505 (Cum. Supp. 2009)
(discussing only the possibility of a conditional release upon the finding "that the person's mental
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence").
11. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
12. See, e.g., Eric Harrison, Tougher Sex-Crime Laws Spark Right-to-Know Flap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1997, at Al.
13. Quote attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky. RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 286 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
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punishment. States, therefore, should require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
II.IN RE VAN ORDEN'S FACTS AND HOLDING
Richard Wheeler and John Van Orden had sordid histories of sexually
violent behavior and mainly victimized children. Wheeler, born in
1947, had convictions dating back to 1967 for sexual abuse, sexual
misconduct, molestation, and sodomy. 14 Van Orden, born in 1962, first
offended in 1987 and subsequently received convictions for sexual
misconduct, sexual abuse, and molestation.15
The State's attempts to rehabilitate Wheeler and Van Orden through
sex offender treatment during periods of incarceration proved
unsuccessful. While serving a ten-year sentence for first-degree
statutory sodomy involving a four-year-old boy, Wheeler refused sex
offender treatment and continued to engage in sexually offensive
behavior. 16 Prior to Wheeler's release from prison for the sodomy
offense, a psychologist from the Department of Corrections determined
that Wheeler might meet the definition of a sexually violent predator.1 7
She accordingly notified the State Attorney General, who filed a petition
for Wheeler's commitment.1 8 After a bench trial, the court found that
Wheeler met the definition of an SVP by clear and convincing evidence
and ordered him committed.1 9
Van Orden, who served a seven-year sentence for first-degree child
molestation of a four-year-old girl, violated his parole conditions twice
by drinking alcohol and receiving an unsuccessful discharge from sex
offender treatment. 20 After Van Orden's return to state custody due to
his second parole violation, the Department of Corrections similarly
notified the Attorney General that Van Orden might qualify as an SVP,
and the Attorney General then filed a petition to commit him.21 At Van
Orden's jury trial, the State's psychologist diagnosed Van Orden with
pedophilia and anti-social personality disorder and opined that he was
14. In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
15. Id. at 583.
16. Id. at 582-83.
17. Id. at 583.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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more likely than not to sexually re-offend if not committed. 22 The jury
found Van Orden to be an SVP by clear and convincing evidence, and the
judge ordered him committed. 23
Prior to their respective commitments, both Wheeler and Van Orden
filed motions to dismiss the State's commitment petitions in the trial
court. 24 They argued, inter alia, that the 2006 amendment to section
432.495 of Missouri's Sexually Violent Predator Act 25  was
unconstitutional because due process requires the State to prove that a
person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than by clear and convincing evidence.26 Both
motions were denied by the trial courts, but Wheeler and Van Order
appealed the issue to the Missouri Supreme Court. 27 In a consolidated
action, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts' decisions
and held that Missouri "constitutionally may utilize the clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof' to effectuate the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators. 2
III.LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Kansas v. Hendricks Decision
In 1997, in a five to four decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States first upheld a sexually violent predator statute against
constitutional attack in the case of Kansas v. Hendricks.29 Kansas's SVP
law provided for the indefinite confinement of any person who, due to a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, was found likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence. 30  The Honorable Clarence
Thomas, writing for the majority, found that the Act properly limited
confinement to those who could not control their dangerousness. 31 The
Court also held that because the Act was civil and non-punitive in
nature, it did not violate the Constitution's prohibition on Double
22. Id. at 583-84.
23. Id. at 584.
24. Id. at 583.
25. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
26. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 583.
27. Id. at 581-82,583.
28. Id. at 582, 586.
29. 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(a), 59-29a07(a) (1994).
31. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348, 358.
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Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto laws.3 2
The Hendricks Court stated that, under the Kansas SVP statute, the
purpose of the confinement is to hold the sexually violent predator until
his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others. 33
Therefore, an SVP is entitled to release when he "is adjudged 'safe to be
at large.' ' 34 In dicta, however, the Court stated that to ensure the safety
of the community, a State may involuntarily commit one for whom no
treatment is available, and thus, left open the possibility that a State
might civilly restrain a person's liberty in perpetuity. 35 The Court has
reaffirmed this stance in later opinions, stating that "[f]or those
individuals with untreatable conditions... there [is] no federal
constitutional bar to their civil confinement, because the State [has] an
interest in protecting the public from dangerous individuals with
treatable as well as untreatable conditions. '36
B.Constitutional Requirements for the Involuntary Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators
It is well-established that freedom from arbitrary physical restraint by
the government lies at the core of due process. 37 Despite this axiom,
the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly upheld
involuntary commitment statutes, including those for sexually violent
predators, "provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper
procedures and evidentiary standards. ' 38  In general, the Court has
"sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a
'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality."', 39 A showing of both traits is
constitutionally required, as mental abnormality or dangerousness alone
is insufficient to justify involuntary civil commitment. 40 Thus, so long
32. Id. at 369, 371.
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id. at 364 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994)).
35. Id. at 366. ("To conclude otherwise would obligate a State to release certain confined individuals
who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they could not be successfully treated for
their afflictions.").
36. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001).
37. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
38. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
39. Id. at 358.
40. See Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) ("[D]ue process requires that a
person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either
characteristic renders involuntary civil confinement unconstitutional." (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at
2009]
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as the SVP statutes effect the confinement pursuant to proper standards
and evidentiary procedures and require a finding of dangerousness to self
or to others as well as a mental abnormality, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held them to be constitutional. 41
Involuntary commitment statutes are typically justified under the
states' parens patriae powers, as well as its police powers. 42 The parens
patriae function allows the State to care for and attempt to rehabilitate
those citizens who are unable to care for themselves because of an
emotional disturbance. 43  The police powers, on the other hand,
empower the State to protect the community at large from those who
are dangerous due to a mental illness. 44  Courts typically highlight the
rehabilitation and treatment aspects of the involuntary commitment
process, the parens patriae function, and are careful to distinguish civil
commitment from a "'mechanism for retribution and general
deterrence."' 45
Thus, Hendricks underscored the constitutional necessity of
distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to involuntary
confinement from "other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings. ' 46 For the
Hendricks Court, the crucial distinction was the sexually violent
predator's "lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of
future dangerousness. '47
Five years later, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court addressed Kansas's
argument that the Kansas Supreme Court had applied Hendricks in an
overly-restrictive manner when it required a sexually violent predator's
"lack of volitional control" to be total or complete.48  The Crane Court
agreed that Hendricks did not require proof of a total or complete lack
of control and held that an SVP must suffer from a mental illness or
abnormality that results only in "serious difficulty in controlling [his]
77)).
41. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-10 (2002); Young, 531 U.S. at 254, 267; Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 350-53, 371; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366-67, 375 (1986). All of these cases involved
SVP statutes requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Crane, 534 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Young, 531 U.S. at 254; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352-53; Allen, 478 U.S. at 378 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
42. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
43. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
44. Id.; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
45. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
46. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
47. Id.
48. Crane, 534 U.S. at410-11.
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behavior. ' 49 Insisting on a complete lack of control would risk barring
the civil commitment of highly dangerous persons who still had a
modicum of ability to control their behavior.5 0 Though the Crane Court
did not delineate a bright-line test, it indicated that the inability to
control behavior must be severe. 1 Thus, through Hendricks and Crane,
the Supreme Court clarified that an individual's serious inability to
control his impulses,
combined with the prediction of future dangerousness, distinguishes the
sexually violent predator from one better-suited to the criminal justice
system.12
C.Sexually Violent Predator Laws Are Civil and Non-Punitive
Significantly, the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
label the involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators as a
criminal proceeding, and instead, deems such confinement as civil and
non-punitive in nature. 3 A primary reason these laws are regarded as
civil is that State legislatures always denominate them as such and that
designation is extremely difficult to challenge judicially. 4 SVP laws'
stated purposes are always treatment and amelioration of the committed
individual, 5 and thus, the Court has found that SVP laws lack the
retributive and deterrent functions of criminal laws.5 6 Prior criminal
conduct is used for evidentiary rather than retributive purposes, and
unlike criminal laws, sexually violent predator statutes do not require a
finding of scienter prior to commitment.5 7 Given that SVP laws have
never been categorized as criminal in nature, it naturally follows that
they have been upheld in the face of Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
49. Id. at411,413.
50. Id. at 412.
51. Id. at412-13.
52. Id. at410,412.
53. Id. at 409; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-63
(1997).
54. E.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Whether an act is civil or punitive in nature is a matter of
statutory construction. Young, 531 U.S. at 261. The court must ascertain whether the legislature
intended to establish civil proceedings and will reject the legislature's manifest intent only when a
party challenging the act provides the clearest proof that the legislature intended otherwise. Id.
55. E.g., Young, 531 U.S. at 254-55.
56. E.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
57. Id. at 362.
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challenges.58
In another case involving sexually violent predator laws, Seling v.
Young, the Court rejected an "as-applied" challenge to Washington
State's Community Protection Act on Double Jeopardy and Ex Post
Facto grounds.59 Andre Young, confined pursuant to the Washington
Act, alleged that the conditions of his confinement were such as to
render his commitment punitive. 60 The Washington Supreme Court had
already held,
however, and the Ninth Circuit had affirmed, that the Act was civil in
nature. 6
1
The United States Supreme Court stated that an "as-applied"
challenge was unworkable in the context of civil commitment because
individual challenges would never fully resolve whether a particular
scheme as a whole is punitive. 62 The Court therefore believed that "as-
applied" challenges would "prevent a final determination of [a particular
sexually violent predator] scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto Clauses. ' 63 For that reason, the Court held that "[a]n
Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive 'as-applied' to a single
individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses
and provide cause for release. '64
D.Missouri's Sexually Violent Predator Act
Beginning with Washington State in 1990, states around the country
began enacting statutes providing for the involuntary civil commitment
of persons deemed to be sexually violent predators. 65 Effective January
1, 1999, Missouri followed suit and introduced the Sexually Violent
Predator Act. 66 Contained in sections 632.480 through 632.513, the
58. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369, 371.
59. Young, 531 U.S. at254,263.
60. Id. at 255-56, 259. Young alleged that, for seven years, he had been subjected to more restrictive
conditions than those placed on other prisoners and that the restrictions placed upon him were not
reasonably related to a non-punitive goal. Id. at 259. Young also asserted that the facility lacked
certified sex offender treatment providers and that there was no possibility of release. Id. at 260.
61. Id. at 260.
62. Id. at 263.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 267.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (2008).
66. H.B. 1405, Mo. Gen. Assembly (1998) (enacted).
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SVP Act delineates the involuntary civil commitment procedures for
sexually violent predators in Missouri. 67 Section 632.480 defines a
sexually violent predator as one who "[h]as pled guilty or been found
guilty, or been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect...
of a sexually violent offense. '68 However, in order to be an SVP, the
person must also be found to "suffer[ ] from a mental abnormality which
makes [him] more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence" if not civilly committed. 69
The commitment procedure typically begins before the person is
released from a correctional center.70 A psychologist will complete an
end of confinement review and notify the Attorney General and
Multidisciplinary Review Team if he believes the person may meet the
definition of an SVP.71 If the Multidisciplinary Review Team and the
Prosecutorial Review Committee agree with the psychologist's SVP
assessment, the Attorney General will then file a petition for that
person's commitment. 72
Upon the filing of the petition, the court makes a preliminary
determination regarding whether probable cause exists to believe that the
person is an SVP. 73 If the court finds probable cause, the individual is
taken into custody, and the court is required to hold a formal hearing
within seventy-two hours of the individual's confinement. 74 If the court
finds probable cause at the formal hearing, the court orders a psychiatric
evaluation and holds a trial within sixty days thereafter. 75
Section 632.495 provides that "[t]he court or jury shall determine
67. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480-.513 (2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
68. Id. § 632.480(5)(a). A person who "[h]as been committed as a criminal sexual psychopath
pursuant to section 632.475" also satisfies the defmition of an SVP. Id. § 632.480(5)(b).
69. Id. § 632.480(5).
70. Id. § 632.483.1(1). The statute also provides civil commitment procedures for one who is not
presently incarcerated, but who has committed a recent overt act and who has pled guilty to or been
convicted of a sexually violent offense. Id. § 632.484.1.
71. Id. § 632.483.2(3). The Multidisciplinary Review Team is a seven-member team established by
the Director of the Department of Mental Health and the Director of the Department of Corrections to
assess whether or not a person meets the definition of an SVP. Id. § 632.483.4.
72. Id. § 632.486.
73. Id. § 632.489.1.
74. Id. § 632.489.
75. Id. §§ 632.489, 632.492.
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whether, by clear and convincing evidence, the person is a sexually
violent predator. '76 Prior to 2006, section 632.495 required a finding
that the person is an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt.77
E.The 2006 Amendments to Missouri's Sexually Violent Predator Act
Effective June 2006, the Missouri legislature enacted two substantial
reforms to Missouri's SVP statutes.78 The first amendment, at issue in
Van Orden, reduced the burden of proof embodied in section 632.495 to
clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 79
The effect is that, after 2006, a Missouri fact-finder is only required to
find that a person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator by
clear and convincing evidence.80
The remaining amendments, similarly significant but not presented in
Van Orden, establish a conditional release program.81  The program
appears to eliminate the possibility that a person committed as a
sexually violent predator in Missouri will ever obtain a complete
discharge from the Department of Mental Health. Prior to the 2006
amendments, a person confined as an SVP could potentially be
discharged from confinement.8 2 After 2006, however, the SVP statutes
provide that, even "[i]f the court or jury finds that a person's mental
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts
of sexual violence if released, the person shall be conditionally released
as provided in section 632.505. ''83 A conditionally released person is
subject to continual monitoring and oversight by the Department of
Mental Health.8 4
76. Id. § 632.495.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
77. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
78. H.B. 1698, Mo. Gen. Assembly (2006), §§ 632.495.1, 632.498.5(4), 632.505 (enacted).
79. H.B. 1698, § 632.495.1.
80. Id.
81. H.B. 1698, §§ 632.498.5(4), 632.505.
82. See H.B. 1698, §§ 632.498, 632.505 (changing language that provided for a discharge upon a
finding that the committed person's mental abnormality has changed so no longer likely to commit acts
of sexual violence to language that only provides for a conditional release); see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.498.5(4) (Cum. Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 632.505.1.
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The 2006 amendments further provide that annual review will not be
conducted once a person is conditionally released. 85  Accordingly,
section 632.498.1 now states that "[t]he court shall conduct an annual
review of the status of the committed person. The court shall not
conduct an annual review of a person's status if he or she has been
conditionally released pursuant to section 632.505. ,,86
F. The Addington v. Texas Decision
Addington v. Texas first addressed the question of whether an
involuntary civil commitment could be predicated on a finding of clear
and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 87
The Addington Court concluded that although proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was not constitutionally required, 88 a preponderance of
the evidence standard was insufficient to satisfy due process. 89 Thus,
Addington held that a clear and convincing evidence standard in such
proceedings was constitutional, based largely on the understanding that
commitment proceedings are civil and rehabilitative in nature, rather
than criminal and punitive. 90
The Addington Court considered and rejected the appellant's
argument that the rationale of In re Winship, a case that addressed the
rights of juvenile delinquents, 91 applied with equal force in Addington.92
The In re Winship Court held that juveniles, like adults, are
constitutionally entitled to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
when charged with a violation of the criminal law in a delinquency
proceeding. 93  The Winship Court acknowledged that juvenile
delinquency proceedings are not criminal and that the delinquency status
is not made a crime. 94 However, the Winship Court stated that the
gradual assimilation of juvenile delinquency proceedings into traditional
criminal trials warranted the application of the most stringent burden of
proof.95  The Court noted that the State's "civil labels and good
85. H.B. 1698, § 632.498.1.
86. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.498.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
87. 441 U.S. 418,419-20 (1979).
88. Id. at430-31.
89. Id. at 426-27.
90. Id. at 428, 432-33.
91. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
92. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427-28.
93. Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
94. Id. at 365-66.
95. Id.
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intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts. ' 96  The Winship Court went on to state
that "'[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
to be []delinquent[] and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."' 97
The Addington Court's primary rationale in declining to extend the
Winship holding to civil commitment proceedings was that "[i]n a civil
commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense." 98  The
Court highlighted the fact that Texas's SVP statutes confined a person
only to provide care for the individual in question.99 Furthermore, the
committed person was entitled to treatment, periodic reevaluation of his
mental state, and release when he no longer presented a danger to self or
to others.1"'
Given the enlightened goals of an involuntary civil commitment
proceeding, the Addington Court stated that it "can in no sense be
equated to a criminal prosecution." 10 1
IV.ANALYSIS OF THE INRE VAN ORDEN DECISION
In holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is a
constitutional burden of proof in civil commitment proceedings, In re
Van Orden relied almost exclusively on Addington v. Texas. 10 2 Before it
addressed Addington's holding specifically, the Missouri Supreme Court
discussed the interrelationship between due process and various burdens
of proof.103 Due process, the court noted, requires a burden of proof
that accurately reflects the weight of the public and private interests
involved in the case, as well as "'a societal judgment about how the risk
of error should be distributed between the litigants.1'1 0 4 The burden of
proof in routine civil litigation is a mere preponderance of the evidence
96. Id.
97. Id. at 366 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)).
98. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
99. Id. at 428 n.4 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Jamison v. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399,411 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)).
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because private interests predominate. 105 In civil litigation that involves
a fundamental right or liberty interest, however, due process requires
clear and convincing evidence in order to further reduce the risk of an
erroneous decision. 106 Finally, because criminal proceedings implicate
the criminal defendant's liberty interest, due process shifts the risk of
error almost entirely to the State and requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 107
After discussing the significance of the burden of proof, the Missouri
Supreme Court reviewed the United States Supreme Court's reasoning,
proffered in Addington, as to why proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
not constitutionally required in the civil commitment context.108 First,
Addington emphasized that the State is "not exercising its powers in a
punitive sense" in civil commitment proceedings.10 9 Moreover, the SVP
statutes minimize the risk of error by providing ongoing opportunities
for review that reduce the need for a heightened burden of proof.110
Addington also expressed concern whether, given the inherent
uncertainty in psychiatric diagnosis, the State could ever meet the
stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard.1  Finally, Addington
cited federalism concerns and held that whether to set the burden at
beyond a reasonable a doubt or by clear and convincing evidence was a
matter of State prerogative. 112
The Missouri Supreme Court thus used Addington to support its own
rationale for the reduced burden of proof. It immediately stated that,
post-Addington, the choice between the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof and the by clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof was a matter of legislative prerogative. 1 The remainder of the
court's analysis focused largely on the fact that civil proceedings were at
issue, as opposed to criminal proceedings.1 14 Though civil commitments
implicate a liberty interest, the court noted that civil commitments are
not solely punitive because they aim to secure necessary treatment for
105. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 423).
106. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).
107. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 428).
110. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29).
111. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 429).
112. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 431).
113. Id.
114. Id.
2009]
40 RICHVOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:i
the committed person. 115
The Missouri Supreme Court also stressed that the commitment term
for an SVP is not indefinite. 116  Missouri's SVP statutes, the court
reasoned, reduce the risk of an erroneous commitment by providing for
annual review and permitting the offender to file a petition for review at
any time.117 Thus, there are multiple avenues for an SVP to ask the
court to determine whether his mental abnormality has so changed that
commitment is no longer necessary.118 Furthermore, the subject of a
civil commitment petition is afforded many of the same constitutional
protections as a criminal defendant, "including a formal probable cause
hearing, the right to a jury trial, the right to an attorney, and the right
to appeal." 119  Based on the Addington decision and the foregoing
considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Missouri's law for
the civil commitment of sexually violent predators may constitutionally
utilize the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof.120
The Honorable Richard Teitelman dissented.1 21  He posited that
Missouri's civil commitment proceedings were akin to those for juvenile
delinquents in that they had transitioned into "a process that was
tantamount to a traditional criminal proceeding."122  He, therefore,
argued that civil commitment proceedings warranted the application of
the same due process protections as those afforded to both criminal and
juvenile delinquent proceedings, namely proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 123
The crux of Judge Teitelman's dissent relied on his analysis of the
Addington decision. He enumerated the four underlying tenets of
Addington and explained why each one did not apply to Missouri's SVP
statutes.1 24 Judge Teitelman first stated that the lynchpin of Addington,
that Texas's civil commitment statutes were remedial rather than
punitive in nature, was absent in Missouri's revised SVP statutory
scheme. 125 Per amended section 632.505.1, a committed person may be
115. Id.
116. Id. at 586.
117. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.498 (2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 585.
120. Id. at 586.
121. Id. at 592-94 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 592.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 592-93.
125. Id. at 592.
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conditionally released when a court or jury determines that "the
person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely
to commit acts of sexual violence if released.... ' 126 Section 632.505.5,
however, states that a person who is conditionally released "remains
under the control, care, and treatment of the department of mental
health." 127  Therefore, Judge Teitelman argued that Missouri's SVP
statutes are punitive, rather than remedial, because they subject an SVP
to perpetual oversight by the Department of Mental Health. 128
Secondly, Judge Teitelman argued that Addington relied on the fact
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt had historically been reserved for
criminal cases. 129 Since the Addington decision in 1979, however, he
asserted that numerous states have enacted SVP statutes that require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that, until 2006, Missouri was
among these states. 130  Thus, he argued that Addington's historical
rationale was less applicable today than in 1979.131
Thirdly, Judge Teitelman argued that the Addington decision relied on
the SVP statutes' provisions providing for ongoing review of the
committed person's mental condition and his immediate release if his
condition improved sufficiently. 132  Under Missouri's revised SVP
statutory scheme, however, Judge Teitelman again stressed that section
632.505.5 only provides for conditional release and subjects persons to
continuing supervision by the Department of Mental Health, even after
they have been successfully treated. 133 He noted that the State admitted
in oral argument that only a "miniscule percentage" of those committed
pursuant to Missouri's SVP law have ever been released. 134  He,
therefore, argued that "[b]oth the plain language and actual
administration of [Missouri's] SVP law lead to the inescapable
conclusion that the initial commitment decision under the SVP law is
effectively final." 135
Finally, Judge Teitelman argued that the Addington Court's fear that
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would remain unworkable in the
126. Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.505.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
127. Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.505.5 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 593.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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SVP context has proven unfounded over time. 136  He cited multiple
Missouri cases decided between 1999 and 2006 in which the State proved
the necessity of committing an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt. 137
The Honorable Jacqueline Cook wrote a concurring opinion wherein
she agreed with the majority opinion based on the points that Wheeler
and Van Orden had presented on appeal.1 31 She wrote, however, to
express serious concerns, not raised directly on appeal, regarding the
constitutionality of Missouri's SVP statutory scheme after the 2006
amendments.1 39  Namely, Judge Cook was concerned about the
constitutionality of the conditional release program implemented in
2006.140 She feared that the new statutory structure would result in one
who was no longer dangerous being denied the complete restoration of
his liberty nonetheless.1 41 "A review of the statutory scheme following
the 2006 amendments," she stated, "casts doubt, on whether an
unconditional release or discharge is ever available to a person confined
under the SVP statutes. ' 142  Judge Cook believed such a failure might
constitute a due process violation. 143
V.FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
It is not surprising that Missouri chose to reduce the due process
protections for those deemed to be sexually violent predators in
2006.144 Sex offenders are likely the least respected, most unpopular,
and therefore, the most easily targeted group in the nation. 145  They are
the pariahs of a society that has ostracized them through registration
requirements, residency restrictions, and sexually violent predator
laws. 146  Given the frequently heinous nature of SVPs' offenses,
encumbrances on sex offenders' rights have been effectuated with little
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Cokes v. State, 183 S.W.3d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); In re Spencer, 171 S.W.3d 813
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005); In re Collins, 140 S.W.3d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)).
138. Id. at 588 (Cook, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
141. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 589-90 (Cook, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 591.
143. Id.
144. See supra Part III.E.
145. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 101, 105 (2007).
146. See Charles Toutant, Zoning Out Sex Offenders, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 2005, at 6.
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political resistance and with overwhelming popular support. 147 This,
too, is unsurprising, for what legislator would dare to champion the
constitutional rights of a convicted child molester? Or better yet, a
thrice-convicted child molester? With respect to sexually violent
predators, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon no doubt appealed to
Republicans and Democrats alike when he stated in his role as the former
Attorney General, "[m]y office continues to aggressively pursue the
indefinite commitment of those [sex offenders] who still pose a threat
to the public safety of Missourians., 148
Regardless, Missouri's 2006 amendments to the SVP Act were
disappointing and constitute a blemish on the integrity of the legislative
and judicial branches alike. The legislature reduced the fact-finder's
burden of proof under the SVP Act from beyond a reasonable doubt to
clear and convincing evidence. 149 While Addington holds that states
may constitutionally use the lower, clear and convincing evidence burden
of proof, it does not mandate that standard. 150  The United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States,
sets the minimum protections a State shall afford its citizens, but a State
is always free to provide more.151
Furthermore, while there is no reliable method to calculate the effect
a burden of proof may have on the fact-finder's decision-making
process, one must recognize that "adopting a 'standard of proof is more
than an empty semantic exercise.' 1 5 2  More importantly, "[i]n cases
involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of
proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual
liberty.-"'153 Thus, by lowering the burden of proof necessary to commit
sexually violent predators, Missouri sends a clear signal about the value it
accords to such person's individual liberties. While some may argue that
convicted sex offenders are despicable human beings and deserve no civil
147. See id. (noting that residency restrictions are typically passed with zero opposition).
148. Sarah AuBuchon, DeSoto Man Declared a Sexually Violent Predator: Robert J. Brinkman Was
Convicted in 2004 for Raping 6-Year-Old Girl, STLToDAY.CoM, Aug. 30, 2008,
http://jeffcountyjournal.stltoday.com/articles/2008/09/04/news/sj2tn20080830-083 lndj-perv0.iil.txt
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
149. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
150. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
151. See id. at 433.
152. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)).
153. Id. (quoting Tippett, 436 F.2d at 1166).
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liberties, it is important to remember that individuals who are
involuntarily committed as SVPs have largely completed the prison
terms for their respective crimes. 154  Oftentimes, the Attorney General
files the petition for involuntary commitment only a few days before an
offender's scheduled release.155 Thus, SVP laws are a serious deprivation
of liberty for one who, according to the criminal law, has already repaid
his debt to society.
Separation of powers principles clearly required the Missouri Supreme
Court to defer to the legislature's prerogative to reduce the burden of
proof.156  However, a reading of the majority opinion in Van Orden
leaves the distinct impression that the court did not scrutinize the issues
as it could have. Rather, the court accepted the rationales of Addington,
decided thirty years ago, and mechanistically applied those same
rationales to the newly-revised Missouri SVP Act.157
While portions of the concurring and dissenting opinions addressed
issues not presented on appeal, 158 Judge Teitelman's dissent raised
applicable concerns regarding the lower burden of proof.15 9 He argued
that "the text of the law and the reality of its application reveal a
process whereby the state exercises the power to impose a permanent,
punitive restraint on individual liberty. ' 160  For that reason, he believed
the Act to be punitive rather than remedial and argued it constitutionally
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 161
The implementation of Missouri's SVP Act, as well as sexually
violent predator acts around the country, proves that Judge Teitelman's
assessment is absolutely correct. As of August 2008, Missouri held 103
sexually violent predators in civil commitment. 162 During oral argument
in Van Orden, the State admitted that only a "miniscule percentage" of
154. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.483.1(1) (2006) (authorizing the agency with jurisdiction to notify the
Attorney General that a person may meet the defmition of a sexually violent predator within 360 days
of that person's anticipated release).
155. See, e.g., Holtcamp v. State, 259 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (specifying that the State
filed the petition five days before the prisoner's scheduled release); Bernat v. State, 194 S.W.3d 863,
865 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (specifying that the State filed the petition two days before the prisoner's
anticipated release).
156. In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
157. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
158. Judge Cook's and Judge Teitelman's arguments regarding the constitutionality of the conditional
release program addressed issues not presented on appeal because Wheeler and Van Orden did not
claim they should be entitled to unconditional release. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 586 n.5.
159. Id. at 592 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. AuBuchon, supra note 148.
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Missouri's SVPs had ever been released.163 Release rates around the
country are similarly low, estimated at slightly over one percent. 164
Thus, practice has shown that SVP laws result in indefinite and often
permanent confinement. The logical counterpart of this fact is that
SVP laws are not providing the necessary treatment and rehabilitation
that is their stated goal.
Judge Teitelman cogently argued that the rationale of In re Winship,
which held that due process requires the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for juvenile delinquency proceedings, 165 should apply to
Missouri's SVP Act. 166 Notably, the same concerns that led the United
States Supreme Court to enhance the due process protections for
juveniles apply with equal force to SVP proceedings. Specifically, the
Winship Court was concerned because juvenile proceedings result in a loss
of liberty and engender stigmatization. 167 The same considerations, loss
of liberty and stigmatization, are ubiquitous in the context of the
involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators.
While Judge Teitelman's argument makes perfect analytical sense, the
problem lies in the fact that the United States Supreme Court has never
defined SVP statutes as anything other than civil, non-punitive, and
rehabilitative. 168 This article addressed the inherent difficulty in
challenging a State's designation of a statute as civil. 169  To make
matters more difficult, an individual litigant may no longer challenge a
sexually violent predator statute as punitive "as-applied" after Seling v.
Young.
170
The crux of the problem in challenging SVP laws as punitive is that if
a court were to recognize these statutes as punitive, it would expose
involuntary civil commitment laws for sexually violent predators to
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto challenges and potentially
undermine involuntary commitment proceedings altogether. In short,
163. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 593 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
164. Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of
Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 319, 323 n.23 (2003).
165. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
166. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 592 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
167. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
168. See supra Part III.C.
169. See id.
170. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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challenging these laws as punitive and criminal in nature is not the
avenue to success.
However, Judge Teitelman and Judge Cook also found the newly-
implemented conditional release program constitutionally problematic
because: (1) the conditional release program subjects a sexually violent
predator to perpetual oversight by the Department of Mental Health
without the requisite finding of dangerousness; and (2) there are no
longer due process protections for one who is conditionally released
because there is no provision for his annual review. 71 The majority
correctly declined to address this issue because it was not presented on
appeal, 72 but Judge Teitelman and Judge Cook had the foresight to
envision its import for future adjudications involving the
constitutionality of Missouri's SVP statutory scheme.
The United States Supreme Court has expressed support for a State's
perpetual confinement of one with an untreatable mental illness,
provided that the mental illness is coupled with a finding of
dangerousness. 7 3 However, the Court has never sanctioned the State's
continual confinement or supervision over one who is no longer a
danger to self or to others. The Court has explicitly stated that
involuntary confinement must be directly related to the stated goals,
meaning it must end when the individual is found to no longer be
dangerous. 174  In order to prevent an involuntary confinement which
was initially constitutional from becoming unconstitutional at a later
point in time, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
there must be due process protections in place, meaning annual review,
for those who are subject to involuntary commitment.175 In eliminating
the opportunity for annual review for SVPs who are conditionally
released, 76  Missouri has effectively eliminated their due process
protections.
Missouri's SVP statutory scheme will undoubtedly raise due process
concerns if its provisions are interpreted to allow continuous
171. Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 588-91 (Cook, J., concurring); Id. at 592-93 (Teitelman, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id. at 586 n.5 (majority opinion).
173. See supra Part IlI.B.
174. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) ("[The confinement's duration is instead linked
to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental abnormality no
longer causes him to be a threat to others.").
175. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975); Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Mo.
2007) (en banc) (stating that Missouri's annual review mechanism ensures that involuntary
confinement that was initially permissible will not continue after the basis for it no longer exists).
176. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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Department of Mental Health supervision over one who has been
adjudged no longer dangerous. As noted by Judge Cook, however, the
amended statute on its face does not allow for full discharge from
Department of Mental Health supervision.17 7  One who has been
conditionally released, meaning one who has been found not likely to
commit further acts of sexual violence, remains subject to outpatient
treatment and monitoring by the Department of Mental Health. 17 8
Missouri's revised SVP statutory scheme subjects the conditionally
released person to no fewer than twenty restrictions, in addition to any
others that the court deems necessary. 179  The Statute gives no
indication of when or how one may be unconditionally released. 180
Thus, at this stage it appears that a credible attack against Missouri's
revised Sexually Violent Predator Act must come from one who has been
found "not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released." 181
For the time being though, sexually violent predators in Missouri will
be subject to involuntarily commitments with fewer due process
protections. They will be committed with a lower burden of proof, and
on the rare occasion that an SVP is deemed eligible for release, he may
forever remain under Department of Mental Health supervision. 182 In
2003, prior to the amendments, the Honorable Judge Michael Wolff
expressed concern as to whether even the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof provided a sufficient constitutional safeguard for SVPs,
given the reprehensible and inflammatory nature of their crimes. 183 He
eloquently summarized the due process challenges in such cases:
The reprehensible nature of the offenses makes
observance of constitutional safeguards very difficult.
The elephant in the room, to use a common metaphor,
is that [these men] have been convicted of sexual
offenses involving children.... Once the state decides to
proceed to commit one of these offenders, it can hardly
177. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
178. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.505.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
179. Id. § 632.505.3.
180. See id. § 632.505.
181. Id. § 632.505.1. Again, the problem with this avenue lies in the fact that only a "miniscule
percentage" of SVPs are ever found eligible for release. In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Mo.
2008) (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
182. See supra Part III.E.
183. In re Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 177-78 (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J., concurring).
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lose. 18
4
According to the Supreme Court of the United States, the United
States Constitution does not recognize the involuntary commitment of
sexually violent predators as a punitive and permanent deprivation of
individual liberty-in other words, as a criminal proceeding. 185 Nor does
it require states to utilize the highest burden of proof in order to
involuntarily commit them. 186 The State must, therefore, assume the
onus and give even sex offenders the utmost due process. Though
uttered in the context of the criminal law, Justice Brennan's conviction
in In re Winship has equal application here: "a society that values the
good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man
for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his
guilt." 1
87
184. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
185. See supra Part III.C.
186. See supra Part III.F.
187. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
